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INTRODUCTION
Too many people in the United States are overwhelmed by debt. While
we were once a country of thrift, consumer indebtedness has become a
ubiquitous phenomenon that affects people in both urban and rural areas
and from all socio-economic groups. Because so many people are overindebted,1 the United States is in the midst of a severe economic meltdown
and the magnitude of the federal government’s intervention in the financial
markets is surpassed only by the bailout efforts to end the Great Depression.2
The economic crisis was caused by the record number of defaults on
subprime mortgage loans and the foreclosures that followed those defaults.
For the last two years, U.S. homeowners—like consumers in the rest of the
world—have felt the financial pain associated with rising fuel and food
prices. The increase in the prices of those commodities, however, was not
the reason homeowners started defaulting on their subprime mortgages.
Instead, the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis was triggered by (and then
morphed into a global financial crisis) the over-consumption of consumer
credit generally and our gluttonous consumption of mortgage debt.
This Article discusses the rise in consumer debt generally, the harm that
the current credit crisis has caused to the U.S. economy and global capital
markets, and the specific threats that the current financial crisis pose to
U.S. cities. Part I discusses the increased availability of consumer debt and
how deregulated consumer credit markets, along with technological, demographic, and labor market changes, caused lending standards to become so
relaxed that people were able to buy homes they clearly could not afford.
Part I also notes how shifts in societal views toward thrift and borrowing
have caused too many people to borrow too much in a desperate attempt to
participate in the “American Dream” of homeownership.
Part II focuses on the current financial crisis. This Part presents current
overall consumer debt levels and then discusses the harmful effects of the
financial crisis on homeowners, the financial sector, and even groups that
are unrelated to the housing industry (such as college students). Part II
then briefly describes the initial responses to the financial crisis and the
various, but ultimately failed, attempts to prevent the subprime credit crisis
from spreading.
Part III suggests that, rather than wait for federal bailouts, localities take
proactive steps (including purchasing foreclosed homes) to prevent this fi1. For the purposes of this Article, I define “over-indebtedness” as a consumer’s inability to repay all debts in full in the near future.
2. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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nancial crisis from decimating their cities. The Article ends by stressing
that the metastasizing mortgage crisis threatens to leave urban areas with a
glut of abandoned homes and that an increase in distressed neighborhoods
may reverse years of urban renewal projects.
I. THE INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER DEBT
In the 1960s, it was not easy to obtain low-cost credit. At that time, lowcost credit principally existed in only two forms and was given only to consumers who had stable income and who could document assets that could
be pledged as collateral.3 The first type of low-cost credit consisted of
long-term, conventional mortgages issued either by commercial banks or
the U.S. government.4 The second type consisted of installment loans from
local commercial institutions or credit unions that were issued only after an
official of the lending institution examined the borrower’s income and assets in detail and concluded that the borrower was creditworthy.5
Until the late 1970s, a borrower who wanted to obtain credit to purchase
an item almost always would be forced to have a face-to-face meeting with
the lender and, except for the wealthy, would be required to document their
income and assets.6 Borrowers who did not have assets they could pledge
as collateral and people who could not (or would not) document that they
had stable income would almost always be denied credit. The only type of
credit that might have been available for them would be offered by local
department stores or automobile dealers in the form of installment loans
that would allow them to purchase items only from the lender that issued
the credit.7
That has all changed. Since the late 1970s, consumer credit has risen at
astronomical rates in this country.8 It is impossible to understand the cur3. HOWARD D. CROSSE
CIAL BANKS 175, 181 (2d ed.

& GEORGE H. HEMPEL, MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR COMMER1973).
4. See Adam Gordon, Note, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes
in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and Out
of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 194 (2005) (describing the evolution of low-cost,
long-term credit in the home mortgage market).
5. Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 175,
180 (2007).
6. CROSSE & HEMPEL, supra note 3, at 181. Lenders also waive this requirement for
high-income workers, who might prefer not to disclose their income, but can afford the
monthly payments, and also for self-employed or seasonal workers, who might have high
income, but are unable to verify that income.
7. DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 37
(1974).
8. In August of 1976, the consumer debt outstanding was just over $216 billion. That
number has grown to over $2.5 trillion in 2008. Federal Reserve, Consumer Credit Out-
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rent credit crisis without understanding why so many consumers started
amassing so much debt. To understand that, one must ask why it has become so easy for so many borrowers to get so much credit. For the most
part, the over-consumption of credit can be traced to the deregulation of the
consumer credit market and to the resulting “democratization” of credit.9
A.

Deregulation

Starting in the mid-1970s, the U.S. government deregulated the consumer credit market and made it easier and more profitable to extend credit
to consumers.10 With fewer regulatory controls and especially with relaxed
usury laws, creditors were willing to increase the amount of credit they
would extend to a group of consumers who had until then been deemed
unworthy of credit.11 Indeed, until the mortgage meltdown seized the
credit markets, anyone (regardless of his credit risk) and anything (whether
human or not) could reasonably expect to receive a credit card offer.12
With interest rate ceilings largely lifted, extending credit to even highrisk borrowers became quite profitable. Lenders were willing to give credit
even to borrowers with bad credit (in other words, subprime borrowers)13
because they could charge significantly higher rates to compensate for any
increased risk of default when lending to riskier borrowers.14 The effect
that a deregulated market had on consumer credit transactions can perhaps

standing, http://federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/hist/cc_hist_sa.txt (last visited Mar. 19,
2009).
9. SUSAN JENSEN-CONKLIN, AM. BANKR. INST., MINUTES OF MEETING HELD, PLENARY
SESSION: CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY (1996); Diane Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest
Rate Deregulation on Credit Card Volumes, Charge-Offs, and the Personal Bankruptcy
Rate, in DIV. OF INS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BANK TRENDS: ANALYSIS OF EMERGING
RISKS IN BANKING 9 (FDIC Div. of Ins., Pub. No. 98-05, 1998), available at http://www.
fdic.gov/bank/analytical /bank/bt_9805.pdf; Jean Braucher, Chapters, Changes, and Challenges: A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The Need for Simplification and a
Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1302 (2006).
10. Ellis, supra note 9, at 5-6.
11. Emilio Fernandez-Corugedo & John Muellbauer, Consumer Credit Conditions in the
United Kingdom 5, 8 (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 314, 2006).
12. See Credit Cards at 50: The Problems of Ubiquity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, at
C11 (noting that former Chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan once commented
that “[c]hildren, dogs, cats and moose are getting credit cards”).
13. In general, prime loans are offered to borrowers who have strong credit histories.
Borrowers with weak or limited credit histories or who have high debt ratios generally are
forced into the higher-cost subprime market because they are viewed as posing a higher risk
of default. Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data,
92 FED. RES. BULL. A123, A125 (2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
bulletin/2006/hmda/bull06hmda.pdf.
14. Ellis, supra note 9, at 7.
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best be illustrated by the differences entailed in buying a home pre- and
post-deregulation.
1.

Housing Purchases: Then

People who wanted to borrow money to purchase a home in the United
States up until the 1970s were required to make a significant down payment, then agree to make consistent monthly loan payments for an extended period of time, typically fifteen or thirty years.15 That is, before deregulation, potential homeowners either had to make a down payment of at
least 20% or had to purchase private mortgage insurance (“PMI”) if they
failed to pay 20% down.16 Forcing borrowers to make down payments protected the lender by lowering the total mortgage debt (and, thus, the
lender’s total risk of loss) and also forced the borrowers to make up-front
financial investments in their housing purchases. The down payment requirement ordinarily would be waived only for wealthy borrowers who actually had the funds to make the down payment but wanted to use their
cash to make other investments.17
2.

Housing Purchases: Now

Starting in the early part of this decade, interest rates started to fall and
the United States experienced unprecedented home price appreciation. The
rate of appreciation in some markets was astronomical.18 Housing prices in
the aggregate increased by more than 50% over the last decade and, in
some regions, had annual increases of over 10%.19 These skyrocketing
housing prices benefited some homeowners and created vast sums of

15. See FED. HOUS. AUTH., 28TH ANNUAL REPORT 93-94 (1961) (noting that current investments—down payment plus closing costs—averaged about 16% of income for newhome purchasers). In 1971, 99.9% of all mortgages were for a term of twenty years or
more. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS & RESEARCH BRANCH, FED. HOUS. AUTH., FHA TRENDS OF
HOME MORTGAGE CHARACTERISTICS: 3D QTR. 1972, at 6 (1973).
16. ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., EXOTIC OR
TOXIC? AN EXAMINATION OF THE NON-TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET FOR CONSUMERS
AND LENDERS 12 (2006), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/exotic_toxic
_mortgage_report0506.pdf.
17. Id.; Pamela Gaynor, Homeowners May Be Mortgaging Their Future with New Loan
Products, PITTS. POST-GAZETTE, July 31, 2005, at A1.
18. Frederic S. Mishkin, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech
Before the Forecaster’s Club of New York: Enterprise Risk Management and Mortgage
Lending (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
Mishkin20070117a.htm.
19. FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 16, at 28.
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wealth for them.20 These gains were not, however, evenly distributed and
housing price appreciation ultimately created a significant unaffordability
problem for renters who wanted to purchase homes—especially homes in
some east and west coast markets.21
The extended boom in house price appreciation actually fueled the consumption of housing (and of the mortgages associated with those houses)
that otherwise would not have been possible. That is, while non-traditional
loan products were offered ostensibly to make housing more affordable,
these loan products actually aggravated the meteoric house price appreciation. By allowing cash-strapped borrowers with bad credit to buy a home
with no money down, and by letting these borrowers make artificially low
monthly payments, consumers who could not afford to buy these homes
suddenly could afford to become a homeowner even though the loan products placed the borrowers at great financial risk.
Of course, some borrowers may have been greedy by attempting to purchase a house they simply could not afford, and others may have engaged
in outright fraud. For example, recent reports suggest that some borrowers
intentionally inflated their incomes on liar loans,22 rented or borrowed the
credit scores of more creditworthy borrowers, paid to be added to the credit
cards of people with good credit histories, or bought fake payroll stubs.23
20. See Hang Nguyen, Will Their Kids Ever Be Able to Buy a House?, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8,
2005, at 12 (describing how homeowners in Orange County, California, benefit from the
rise in home prices, but are concerned because their children cannot afford homes in the
same area); see also Jon Birger, Should You Cash out While You Can?, MONEY, Aug. 1,
2005, at 51.
21. See, e.g., Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, The Behavior of Home Buyers in Boom
and Post-Boom Markets 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2748,
1988) (discussing capriciousness of housing price appreciation wealth distribution); see also
Affordable Housing Needs in the City of Houston: Unique Challenges and Opportunities:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Economic Opportunity of the H. Comm. on
Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (testimony of Daniel Bustamante, Executive Director, Greater Houston Fair Housing Center), available at http://financialservices
.house.gov/hearing110/htbustamante102907.pdf (stating that the “dream of home ownership
continues to be just a dream for most working people” in Houston).
22. Gretchen Morgenson, Crisis Looms in Market for Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2007, at A1 (reporting that liar loans were 40% of the subprime mortgage issuance in 2006).
Members of the mortgage industry suggest that some borrowers took out a mortgage to buy
a home with the intent only of living in the home rent-free until they were evicted. See
Justin Lahart, After Subprime: Lax Lending Lurks Elsewhere, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2007, at
C1. Of course, the increased practice of approving low documentation subprime loans increases the likelihood of buyer misrepresentation.
23. Julie Creswell, Fake Pay Stubs Online, and Other Mortgage Fraud, N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 2007, at A1; see The Role of the Secondary Market in Subprime Mortgage Lending: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H.
Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 131 (2007) [hereinafter The Role of the Secondary
Market] (statement of Larry B. Litton, Jr., President, CEO, Litton Loan Servicing LP) (stat-
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Other homeowners, however, especially first-time homeowners, appear to
have been naïve, unsophisticated, and genuinely seemed shocked to learn
that it would be difficult to sell their homes once the housing market
stalled. Likewise some seemed surprised to discover that, even though they
had no equity in their homes, refinancing their high-cost loans was not an
option.24 Finally, information asymmetry appears to have caused some of
these borrowers to accept expensive, non-traditional, mortgage products
even though they did not understand the loan features25 and even though
they may have qualified for a lower-cost loan product.26

ing that defaults were “the result of lax underwriting standards, improper documentation, or
borrower fraud”); see also MERLE SHARICK ET AL., MORTGAGE ASSET RESEARCH INST., LLC,
NINTH PERIODIC MORTGAGE FRAUD CASE REPORT TO MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION 11
(2007).
24. Subprime and Predatory Mortgage Lending: New Regulatory Guidance, Current
Market Conditions, and Effects on Regulated Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial
Servs., 110th Cong. 396-97 (2007) [hereinafter Subprime and Predatory Lending] (statement of Harry H. Dinham, President, National Association of Mortgage Brokers) (speculating on the cause of the increase); FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 16, at 2, 6, 11; Vikas
Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Home Lenders Hit by Higher Default Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2007, at C1. Consumers, in general, suffer from an overconfidence bias that leads them to
believe that they will not overuse credit and that, if they do, they will somehow find money
to repay their debts. Oren Bar-Gill, Homo Economicus, Homo Myopicus, and the Law and
Economics of Consumer Choice: Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 33, 45 (2006); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1395–
1401 (2004).
25. See Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24, at 72-73 (statement of Sheila
C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); id. at 351 (statement of Allen
Fishbein, Director of Housing and Credit Policy, Consumer Federation of America); BRIAN
BUCKS & KAREN PENCE, FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, DO HOMEOWNERS KNOW THEIR
HOUSE VALUES AND MORTGAGE TERMS? 26 (2006), available at http://www.federalreserve
.gov/Pubs/feds/2006/200603/200603pap.pdf; MARK WIRANOWSKI, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS.
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., SUSTAINING HOME OWNERSHIP THROUGH EDUCATION AND
COUNSELING 6 (2003) (discussing informational rents extracted from naïve homeowners
when lenders offer complex products that are not conducive to consumer comprehension),
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/w03-7_wiranowski.
pdf.
26. See Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24, at 76 (statement of Sheila C.
Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); id. at 351 (statement of Allen
Fishbein, Director of Housing and Credit Policy, Consumer Federation of America); BUCKS
& PENCE, supra note 25, at 26; FANNIE MAE, THE GROWING DEMAND FOR HOUSING: 2002
FANNIE MAE NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY (2002), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/
global/pdf/media/survey/survey2002.pdf.
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Responses to the Unaffordability Problem

Because of the low (and, in many years, negative) U.S. savings rate,27
the down payment requirement often prevented renters in low-income and
urban areas from becoming homeowners.28 Likewise, because potential
homeowners lacked the capital to reduce the principal amount of the mortgage debt by making a sizeable down payment, many found that they could
not afford the monthly payments for traditional thirty-year fixed interest
rate mortgages. The U.S. government encouraged mortgage originators to
help rectify this affordability problem by diversifying their loan products.
The lending industry eagerly complied with this request by radically altering the criteria they applied when approving mortgage loans and by creating and extensively marketing a wide array of non-traditional (also called
“exotic” or “alternative”) products.29 These exotic loans had several common features.
While conventional mortgage products pre-deregulation typically were
for fifteen- or thirty-year periods, to make monthly loan payments more affordable, some of the new mortgage products offered extended maturity
mortgage loans for terms up to forty or fifty years.30 In addition, while
lenders historically had required all borrowers (except perhaps very rich
ones) to document their income and assets, lenders not only began to gen-

27. Until the recent financial meltdown, for the last several years the United States has
had a negative savings rate: Americans saved less than they spent on goods or services.
News Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Personal Income and Outlays (Sept. 2007),
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2007/pi0907.htm. Ironically, the current economic downturn has now caused U.S. consumers to save more. News Release, Bureau of
Econ. Analysis, Personal Income and Outlays (Nov. 2006), http://www.bea.gov/news
releases/national/pi/2006/pi1106.htm; see also Kelly Evans, Hard-Hit Families Finally Start
Saving, Aggravating Nation’s Economic Woes, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 6, 2009, at A1.
28. See Julie Kosterlitz, Home Sweet Home?, NAT’L J., Mar. 6, 2004.
29. The Mortgage Bankers Association defines “nontraditional mortgage products” as
“financing options which have been developed to increase flexibility and affordability and
otherwise meet the needs of homebuyers who have been purchasing homes in an environment where real estate prices have increased faster than borrowers’ incomes.” Preserving
the American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices and Home Foreclosures: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) [hereinafter Preserving the American Dream] (statement of Douglas G. Duncan, Senior Vice President of Research and Business Development, and Chief Economist, Mortgage Bankers
Association), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/duncan.pdf.
30. FITCH RATINGS, 2006 GLOBAL STRUCTURED FINANCE OUTLOOK: ECONOMIC AND
SECTOR-BY-SECTOR ANALYSIS (2006); Gretchen Morgenson, Home Loans: A Nightmare
Grows Darker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at C1; Holden Lewis, 50-Year Mortgage Debuts
in California, BANKRATE.COM, Apr. 27, 2006, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/
mortgages/20060427a2.asp. Extended maturity mortgage loans have terms for longer than
thirty years and produce a product that looks substantially similar to a monthly rental payment. See id. (describing the forty-year loan, which results in lower monthly payments).
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erally approve loans for borrowers who did not document their income and
assets but often would not even ask borrowers to do so. To make it easier
to approve loans (and perhaps to make it less likely that either the loan officer or borrower would be forced to falsify documents), lenders approved
no documentation or low documentation (commonly referred to as “no
doc,” “low doc,”“ or “liar”) loans.31 In approving these loans, lenders used
fairly minimal standards to verify the borrower’s income and assets and
typically relied on the credit scoring devices that credit card companies
used when deciding whether to give a consumer a credit card.32
The unaffordability problem that housing price appreciation created,
coupled with a negative savings rate, made it difficult for renters in most
income groups to amass the funds needed to make a down payment. To alleviate this problem, lenders relaxed (and at times altogether abandoned)
the down payment requirement.33 Moreover, to make it easier for renters
without savings to buy homes, lenders offered mortgages with high loan-tovalue (“LTV”) ratios that would permit borrowers to take out a loan (or
loans) equal to the sales price of their home.34 For example, rather than re31. Peter Henderson et al., Frenzy of Risky Mortgages Leaves Path of Destruction,
REUTERS, May 8, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSN03298922200705
08; see also Preserving the American Dream, supra note 29, at 4-6 (statement of Jean Constantine-Davis, Senior Attorney, AARP Foundation), available at http://banking.senate.gov/
public/_files/davis.pdf (describing perils to consumer of “stated income” loans). A different
variation of stated income loans are no income, no asset (“NINA”) loans. With these loans,
the borrower is not required to disclose income or assets. See, e.g., No Income Documentation Home Loans, http://www.bestnodocloans.com/content/nina_loan.htm (last visited Mar.
2, 2009). These loans are approved based on the borrower’s employment, credit history, the
property value, and the down payment (if any). Another variation, a no income no asset, no
employment (“NINANE”) loan, does not require the borrower to disclose income, assets, or
employment. See id.
32. Because those scoring devices have never been used to verify income (and, indeed,
do not consider income at all), lenders protected themselves from the increased risk of default by charging borrowers higher interest rates for these loans. See Kenneth R. Harney,
The Lowdown on Low-Doc Loans, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2006, at F1 (describing how lowdoc and no-doc loans work). Credit scores are neither designed to predict whether a borrower will face a payment shock and be unable to make payments on an ARM mortgage
loan after the interest rate resets, nor are they designed to anticipate whether economic conditions will permit the borrower to refinance the ARM loan to a more affordable product.
Therefore, using credit scores to approve liar loans increases the risk that borrowers cannot
afford to repay the loans and likely will default.
33. William E. Nelson & Norman R. Williams, Suburbanization and Market Failure:
An Analysis of Government Policies Promoting Suburban Growth and Ethnic Assimilation,
27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 197, 226−33 (1999) (tracing the history of government intervention
in the housing markets to expand home ownership by loosening financial requirements).
34. Calculated Risk: Assessing Non-Traditional Mortgage Products, Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Housing and Transportation and the Subcomm. on Economic Policy of the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 4, 6 (2006) [hereinafter
Calculated Risk] (statement of William A. Simpson, Vice President, Mortgage Insurance
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quiring borrowers to make a $20,000 down payment when purchasing a
$100,000 home, lenders would let borrowers purchase a home with no
money down by taking out a first mortgage (typically for 80% of the value
of the home) and then a simultaneous second mortgage (or line of credit)
for the balance of the sales price, a loan system commonly referred to as a
“piggyback” loan.35
Perhaps the most significant differences between pre- and postderegulation mortgages, however, were the prevalence of the flexible interest rates that the new products offered and the loan features that made it
possible for borrowers (including those with poor credit) to have low initial
monthly loan payments. Traditional, pre-deregulation, mortgages almost
always calculated the borrower’s monthly payment based on principal and
a fixed rate of interest.36 In contrast, most of the new non-traditional innovated mortgages typically had adjustable interest rates (known as adjustable
rate mortgages, or “ARMs”) that started low then adjusted on specific future dates.37 Once the rate “reset,” the low initial monthly payments would
increase based on the new, higher “fully-indexed” rate.38 Because monthly
payments could increase dramatically at the reset, there could be catastro-

Companies of America), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ACF84D5.pdf;
FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 16, at 12.
35. Piggyback lending arrangements let borrowers avoid purchasing PMI. Borrowers
sometimes put no money down, though many borrowed 80% with a traditional mortgage,
10% as a second loan, and put 10% down. FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 16, at 3;
Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data, 92 FED.
RES. BULL. A123, A135, A137-38 (2006).
36. See Fed. Hous. Admin., Common Questions About an FHA-Insured Loan,
http://portal.hud.gov (follow “Consumers” hyperlink; then follow “FHA Consumer Marketplace” hyperlink; then follow “FHA Insured Loans Q&A” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10,
2009) (comparing FHA and conventional loans).
37. After the initial period, monthly payments “reset” and borrowers are required to pay
down (amortize) the mortgage at a faster rate. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE
SYS., INTEREST-ONLY MORTGAGE PAYMENTS AND PAYMENT-OPTION ARMS—ARE THEY
FOR YOU? 3-4 (2006) [hereinafter INTEREST-ONLY MORTGAGE]. Some products, like deferred interest ARMs, included annual caps that let borrowers remain in their homes notwithstanding any temporary payment shock caused when the interest rates reset. If the reset
interest rate caused the monthly payments to exceed this cap, the borrower could defer interest payments and the deferred interest would be added to principal balance. See Greg
McBride, Home Loan Elements Can Be Risky: Adjustable Rates Can Be Unpredictable for
Borrowers, DETROIT NEWS, Sep. 12, 2004, at 3D.
38. Mortgage originators calculate the interest rate for an ARM by referring to a published index rate then adding a few percentage points (“the margin”) to that rate. The adjusted rate, generally referred to as the “fully-indexed” rate, for an ARM is the margin plus
index rate. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON
ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES 8-9 (2006) [hereinafter CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ARMS],
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms/arms_english.htm.
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phic consequences if borrowers could not afford the new higher monthly
payments and often suffered what is referred to as a “payment shock.”39
One product in particular is widely believed to be the main reason the
U.S. subprime mortgage market started to collapse. This product—a “hybrid ARM”—started as a thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage with a short-term
introductory interest rate (a “teaser” rate) then converted to an ARM after
two to three years.40 The interest rate on these “2/28s” and “3/27s” would
then periodically reset over the thirty-year term of the loan and the borrower’s monthly payment after the first two or three years would be recalculated and would change based on the interest rate in effect when the loan
rate reset.41
C.

Technology

In addition to decreased regulation of consumer credit generally (and
mortgage debt specifically), technological advances also made it easier for
lenders to dramatically expand the amount of consumer debt (both mortgage and credit card) they were willing to give high-risk borrowers. Mortgage and credit card applications are available and can be approved in a
matter of seconds on the internet. No longer are bank officers required to
scrutinize a potential borrower’s financial information. Instead, when deciding whether to grant a credit application, lenders now rely on credit
scores and other modeling devices to evaluate the borrower’s credit and determine the probability that a borrower will default. These scoring devices
combine individual and statistical risks, and have largely replaced face-toface meetings between potential borrowers and lenders in most routine
consumer credit transactions in the United States and in other nations.42
39. See FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 16, at 9-12; see also Subprime and Predatory
Lending, supra note 24, at 6 (statement of Shelia C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); Les Christie, Subprime Bailouts: How They Work, CNNMONEY, Apr.
24, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/04/24/real_estate/bailout_plans_how_they_work/
index.htm. The lending industry also refers to a payment shock as “reset payment sensitivity.” See CHRISTOPHER L. CAGAN, FIRST AM. REAL ESTATE SOLUTIONS, MORTGAGE PAYMENT RESET:
THE RUMOR AND THE REALITY 19 (2006), available at http://www.
loanperformance.com/infocenter/whitepaper/FARES_resets_whitepaper_021406.pdf.
40. Until recently, hybrid ARMs dominated the ARM market. FISHBEIN & WOODALL,
supra note 16, at 10; John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks at the National
Foundation for Credit Counseling Spring Meeting 2 (Apr. 24, 2007), available at
http://occ.gov/ftp/release/2007-44a.pdf. Many large lenders no longer offer these loans. Vikas Bajaj, Top Lender Sees Mortgage Woes for ‘Good’ Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25, 2007, at
A1.
41. FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 16, at 10. While all ARMs adjust upward, not all
of them adjust downward. See CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ARMS, supra note 38, at 6-7.
42. See RONALD MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 113-14 (2006) (noting that credit bureaus allowed lenders to deter-
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Not surprisingly, because credit can now be quickly and efficiently approved, creditors have extended considerably more credit than they did
twenty years ago.43
The demand for credit, especially credit cards, has also been fueled by
advances in technology. Because of the omnipresence of the internet and
the explosion in online shopping opportunities, most consumers need to
have a credit card in order to shop on the internet. Though one can, of
course, debate whether anyone needs to shop on the internet, once the decision is made to shop online it is virtually impossible to do so without a
credit card.44
D.

U.S. Labor Markets

U.S. consumer debt levels also appear to have increased because of dramatic changes in U.S. labor markets over the last two decades. Permanent
unemployment rates in the United States have remained at approximately
5% for the last several years. While they have started increasing during the
current credit crisis, rates have not increased significantly over the last two
decades.45 Even while permanent unemployment rates have remained
fairly low, however, U.S. workers are at an increased risk of having spells
of temporary unemployment either because of global outsourcing of jobs
from the United States, or because corporate restructurings have resulted in
workers either being terminated or laid off for short periods of time.46 For

mine the potential performance of future borrowers, resulting in this technique being widely
used along with computer technology advancement in the 1990s).
43. Emilio Fernandez-Corugedo & John Muellbauer, Consumer Credit Conditions in the
United Kingdom 5 (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 314, 2006); Oliver J. Haas, Overindebtedness in Germany 2 (Int’l Labour Office Geneva, Working Paper No. 44, 2006); see
also MANN, supra note 42, at 113-14 (noting that increased accuracy of risk assessment allowed lenders to increase amounts lent to consumers, indicating a positive relationship between credit bureau data and increased consumer lending).
44. Some companies like Paypal do let buyers make purchases by deducting the cost of
the item from their banking accounts. Paypal, http://www.paypal.com/aboutus.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
45. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS
FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsatabs.htm
(last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (follow hyperlink to Table A-10: Employed and Unemployed
Persons by Occupation, Not Seasonally Adjusted, and calculate data from 1988 to 2008).
46. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 84-85 (2000); Press
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Extended Mass Layoffs Associated with Domestic and
Overseas Relocations, First Quarter 2004 (June 10, 2004), available at http://stats.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/reloc.pdf; N. Gregory Mankiw & Phillip Swagel, The Politics and Economics of Offshore Outsourcing 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
12398, 1981), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2006/HIER2120.
pdf.
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many workers, a temporary layoff can be just as catastrophic as a job termination because they have no savings and, thus, no nest-egg to rely on to
pay their expenses until they get a new job (or get their old job back).
In addition to the increased risk of temporary unemployment, income
has not kept pace with inflation, except for those in the highest earning
brackets.47 When combined with a lack of savings, stagnant wages have
caused U.S. workers to rely on consumer credit to help them pay their
monthly expenses.48 With flat earnings and no savings, temporarily unemployed workers came to view consumer credit, and especially credit cards,
as a substitute for savings.49
Finally, even fully employed workers in the United States may find it
hard to pay their expenses if they have catastrophic medical expenses. That
is, even if the person works and has health insurance, he will likely be required to pay a large percentage of his health costs either in the form of copayments or because of health insurance lifetime caps. Thus, the combination of stagnant and declining real wages in the United States and virtually
no savings causes many consumers to use credit to pay for medical expenses even if they have health insurance.50
E.

Changed Norms
1.

Thrift

While there still seems to be a stigma associated with being insolvent,51
there no longer seems to be any stigma associated with going deeply into
debt.52 Credit is seductive, and for some consumers it almost seems to be
addictive.53 Delayed gratification is simply no longer the norm in the
47. Greg Ip, Not Your Father’s Pay: Why Wages Today Are Weaker, WALL ST. J., May
25, 2007, at A2.
48. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 114.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 146; Health Insurance Caps Leave Patients Stranded, MSNBC, Jul. 13, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25644309/.
51. 151 CONG. REC. S2421 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“People I have known who have gone through bankruptcy are not proudly announcing to their
friends: Well, I had a great day in bankruptcy court. These are people who are a little embarrassed, a little ashamed of what they had to go through.”); Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy
Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 485-87 &
nn.21-27 (2006); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Less Stigma or More Financial Distress, 59
STAN. L. REV. 213, 218 (2006).
52. STUART VYSE, GOING BROKE: WHY AMERICANS CAN’T HOLD ON TO THEIR MONEY
61-89 (2008); David Brooks, The Culture of Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 22, 2008, at A19.
53. See Jennifer Levitz, Hi, My Name Is Fred, and I’m Addicted to Credit, WALL ST. J.,
June 10, 2008, at 1; Steven Mufson, End of Cheap Credit Hits Homes, Businesses, WASH.
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United States, and people no longer seem to think there is a moral or ethical
duty to exercise the restraint to actually wait until one can afford to pay for
non-essential goods and services with cash before purchasing those items.54
Consumers today want the immediate gratification associated with having
goods and services, and with having those things now.55 Indeed, many now
argue that the United States no longer has a culture of thrift and, instead,
has a culture of debt fueled in large part by these changed norms.56
2.

The Myth of Homeownership

Even when it became clear that irresponsible lending practices would
force the government to intervene in the financial markets, many in the
lending community and many governmental officials blamed consumers
for buying homes they could not afford and argued that borrowers should
not be pitied or rescued because to do so would create a moral hazard problem.57 When lenders made it easier for potential homebuyers to increase
their mortgage debt, borrowers (both homeowners and real estate speculators) voraciously consumed mortgage debt to ensure that they could take
advantage of the supra-normal housing price appreciation.58 Renters were
desperate to become homeowners principally because they believed in the
hype associated with the “American Dream of Homeownership.”
The belief that homeownership is a good thing financially and psychologically caused many renters to do whatever it took to enter into the
vaulted state of homeownership. For example, it is undisputed that many
consumers borrowed recklessly in order to live in a “McMansion.”59 As
POST, Mar. 18, 2008, at D1 (discussing Bankaholic.com, a website that lets consumers
“shop” for credit cards and mortgages).
54. VYSE, supra note 52.
55. Id. at 75.
56. See Brooks, supra note 52.
57. Patrice Hill, Blame Abounds for Housing Bust, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2007, at A1;
Editorial, The American Dream in Reverse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007.
58. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S
HOUSING 5 (2007), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2007/
son2007.pdf.
59. See Larry Rohter & Edmund L. Andrews, McCain Rejects Broad U.S. Aid on Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2008, at A1 (quoting Republican Presidential nominee John
McCain “[s]ome Americans bought homes they couldn’t afford, betting that rising prices
would make it easier to refinance later at more affordable rates”); see also Jessica Holzer,
Major Bailout Is Unlikely on Sub-prime Mortgages, HILL, Sept. 4, 2007,
http://thehill.com/business--lobby/major-bailout-is-unlikely-on-sub-prime-mortgages-200709-04.html (reporting quote of President Bush, “[i]t’s not the government’s job to bail out
speculators, or those who made the decision to buy a home they knew they could never afford”); Irwin M. Stelzer, Why They Call It the Dismal Science, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 26,
2007, at 1.
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noted earlier, some borrowers inflated their incomes on liar loans or attempted to use the credit of more creditworthy borrowers 60
Even if it was utterly unrealistic for borrowers to think that their houses
would never stop appreciating, homebuyers routinely discounted the risks
associated with buying a home.61 For example, some borrowers were naïve
(and perhaps greedy) in assuming that they could always expect their
homes to increase in value. Though this, obviously, is an unrealistic perspective, homebuyers’ behavior during the most recent housing boom was
entirely consistent with buyer behavior during any boom market. That is,
once home prices start to rise, the market builds in the expectation that the
increase is the norm and this expectation, in turn, increases borrower demand for houses which, in turn, stimulates the demand for those homes and
further causes the price of the houses to increase.62 As has been the case
during other housing booms, some borrowers made irrational decisions in
order to reap the potentially enormous profits in the housing price appreciation game.63 While borrowers may not have understood the true risks associated with home ownership, the more sophisticated players (like economists, home builders, and lenders) were, of course, fully aware of the effect
house appreciation has on borrower behavior. 64
Whether greed, naiveté, or some other human factor caused borrowers to
purchase homes they could not afford using mortgage products they often
could not understand, once deregulation made it possible for consumers to
borrow, borrow they did. For the last decade, this country’s views about
the norm of homeownership caused people to routinely buy homes using
mortgage products they knew they would not be able to afford once the interest rates increased. Some borrowers knew they did not have the savings
necessary to make mortgage payments once interest rates increased, but
nonetheless signed the loan documents. These borrowers gambled that the
supra-normal trend in house price appreciation would continue and that interest rates would remain low. They gambled that they would be able to
refinance the loans when the monthly payments increased, or that they

60. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
61. Case & Shiller, supra note 21, at 35-37.
62. Id. at 9-13; KARL E. CASE ET AL., HOME-BUYERS, HOUSING AND THE MACROECONOMY (2003), available at http://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/pdf/CQSAustralia0804PB.pdf.
63. Robert J. Shiller, A Psychology Lesson from the Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2007, at C6. See generally Case & Shiller, supra note 21, at 8-13 (discussing investment
motives for homebuyers who intended to occupy their houses).
64. Mishkin, supra note 18.
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would be able to sell their homes and make a profit.65 Sadly, the current
foreclosure rates (which are the highest they have been in three decades)
and the depth of the financial crisis are the result of this gamble.66
II. CONSUMER DEBT AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
A.

Overall Debt Levels

The United States has the highest consumer debt levels per capita of any
nation, and consumer debt has grown exponentially since 1976. Home and
automobile loans, credit card debt, and consumer credit have all increased
dramatically in the last few years.67 For example, in 1977, total U.S.
household debt outstanding was $946.7 billion; over $600 billion of that
was home mortgage debt. By 2007, that $946.7 billion grew to $13.825
trillion (an increase of over one trillion from 2006)68 and consumers had
$957 billion in credit card and revolving debt just in March 2008.69 Similarly, by 2007, home mortgage debt had increased from $600 billion to a
staggering level of $10.508 trillion, and other consumer debt in 2007 was
$2.550 trillion.70 Another indication of the shockingly high levels of consumer debt can be found by comparing household debt to income and the
U.S. gross domestic product (“GDP”).71 That is, in 2007, U.S. household
65. FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 16, at 2, 11. See generally Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24, at 7 (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Insurance Corporation); Christie, supra note 39.
66. Timothy R. Homan, U.S. Pending Home Resales Rise 7.4% as Prices Drop
BLOOMBERG, Oct. 8, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid
=aM0QF6wHRPoI.
67. As discussed in more detail below, lenders issued mortgage loans using relaxed criteria that let borrowers purchase homes without documenting their income, without putting
money down, and in some instances without paying the full cost of their monthly payments
for the first few years of the loan term. Similarly, automobile lenders started to extend
credit to consumers with subprime credit and in some instances let consumers pay for the
cars over longer periods. David Cho & Nancy Trejos, From Foreclosure Signs to Auto
Repo Lots, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2008, at A1; Robin Sidel, Smaller Banks Begin to Pay
Price for their Boomtime Expansion, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2008, at A1.
68. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Consumer Credit—G.19 (Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter G19 Press Release],
available at http://federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/20080307/g19.pdf.
69. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Consumer Credit—G.19 (July 8, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/
releases/g19/20080708/g19.pdf.
70. G19 Press Release, supra note 68.
71. Gross domestic product is “the output of goods and services produced by labor or
property located in the United States.” News Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Gross
Domestic Products: Fourth Quarter 2008 (Advance) (Jan. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2009/pdf/gdp408a.pdf.
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debt grew at a faster pace than income (or overall economic activity), and
the level of total household debt ($13.825 trillion) in 2007 was virtually
identical to GDP ($13.843 trillion).72
For the last several years, consumer spending in the United States has
accounted for almost 70% of all U.S. economic activity.73 Similarly, housing expenditures have helped buoy U.S. economic growth for the last decade and, at times, contributed to 40% of total economic growth.74 The U.S.
economy is now in a recession largely because of the role that consumer
debt plays in this country and the vast amount of credit that has been extended to consumers over the last thirty years.75 The country’s current
economic crisis was caused principally by staggering mortgage debt levels
and borrowers’ inability to repay their mortgage loans. While the problems
started with subprime mortgages, the financial crisis spread to the entire
housing sector and is now having devastating effects on the entire U.S.
economy as well as global markets.76

72. G19 Press Release, supra note 68.
73. FANNIE MAE, THE GROWING DEMAND FOR HOUSING: 2002 FANNIE MAE NATIONAL
HOUSING SURVEY (2002), http://www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/media/survey/survey
2002.pdf; Peter S. Goodman, Homeowners Feel the Pinch of Lost Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 2007, at A1; Jack Healy, As the Recession Worsens, Consumers Save More and Spend
Less, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at B3. Because higher home prices increase household
wealth, housing price appreciation stimulates consumer spending. See David Leonhardt,
Debt and Spending May Slow as Housing Falters, Fed Suggests, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
2007, at C3; Mishkin, supra note 18.
74. FANNIE MAE, supra note 73, at 2; Morgenson, supra note 30; see also Liz Wolgemuth, The Credit Crunch Squeezes Municipal Bonds, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 28,
2008, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/business/economy/2008/02/28/the-credit
-crunch-squeezes-municipal-bonds.html.
75. See Brooks, supra note 52.
76. The liquidity crisis that originally began in the subprime mortgage market has (as of
October 2008) forced the U.S. government to take over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and
place them in a conservatorship; David M. Herszenhorn, Administration Is Seeking $700
Billion for Wall Street in Possible Record Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at A1; to
purchase an 80% interest in the country’s largest insurance conglomerate (American International Group), Gretchen Morgenson, Your Money at Work, Fixing Others’ Mistakes, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at B1; to devote up to $700 billion in taxpayer dollars to purchase
bad mortgage-backed securities from U.S. banks, Mark Landler & Edmund L. Andrews,
Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at
A1; and has forced the liquidation of a number of mortgage lenders and hedge funds that
invested in those lenders. Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, A Lender Failed. Did Its Auditor?,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008, at B1; Zachary A. Goldfarb & Alec Klein, The Bubble; How
Homeowners’ Missed Mortgage Payments Set off Widespread Problems and Woke up the
Fed., WASH. POST, June 16, 2008, at A1. The U.S. financial crisis has also caused a run on
or contributed to the insolvency of banks in Great Britain and France, caused the largest
bank in France to freeze funds, and generally continues to wreak havoc on the global financial markets. Vikas Bajaj & Mark Landler, Mortgage Losses Echo in Europe and on Wall
Street, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2007, at A1; Mark Landler & Julia Werdigier, In Europe,
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The Housing Crisis

Homeowners are losing their homes in record numbers. Mortgage loan
defaults and foreclosure rates in the United States have hit record levels.
Foreclosures in the United States increased by 81% over 2007 rates, increased by 225% from 2006 rates, and, for much of 2008, almost one in ten
mortgages were either past due or in foreclosure.77 The delinquency rates
on non-traditional loans with adjustable interest rates have been especially
high: the default rates increased by 141% in 2006 over 2005 rates.78 Foreclosure filings on subprime mortgages have steadily increased for the last
five years.79 Subprime loan foreclosures now account for over 60% of total
foreclosure filings even though they accounted for less than 25% of loan
originations, and until recently subprime mortgages were only 13% of all
outstanding mortgages.80 Foreclosure rates on subprime ARMs are especially high81 and reports indicate that more than 40% of the most recent
foreclosures were ARMs made to subprime borrowers.82 Industry experts
project that the higher mortgage default and foreclosure rates will continue
well into 2009.83
Weathering Credit Storm from U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2007, at C1; Joe Nocera, 36
Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A1; Adam Shell,
Subprime Troubles Send Stocks into Swoon, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 14, 2007, at 1B.
77. Vikas Bajaj & Michael M. Grynbaum, About 1 in 11 Mortgageholders Face Loan
Problems, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2008, at C1; Realty Trac, Foreclosure Activity Increases 81
Percent in 2008, http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure/foreclosure-rates.html (last visited
Mar. 13, 2009).
78. Calculated Risk, supra note 34, at 11 (statement of Allen J. Fishbein, Director of
Housing and Credit Policy, Consumer Federation of America), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ACF84D1.pdf.
79. Dan Levy, Foreclosures Doubled in September as Loan Rates Rise, BLOOMBERG,
Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=apDsvvy6RO7
M&refer=home; Credit & Collections World, Nationwide Foreclosures Jumped 75% in
2007, Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.creditcollectionsworld.com/article.html?id=20080129S
4FTCWQT.
80. Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24, at 5 (statement of Michael D. Calhoun, President, Center for Responsible Lending).
81. Subprime loans have higher defaults than prime loans and ARMs have higher default rates and are at a significantly greater risk of foreclosure than fixed rate mortgages.
Loans with high LTV rates have greater defaults than those with low LTV. See Press Release, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, National Civil Rights Groups Call for Immediate Moratorium on Foreclosures Resulting From Risky Subprime Loans (Apr. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/press/releases/page.jsp?itemID=32110619.
82. Levy, supra note 79.
83. Straightening Out the Mortgage Mess: How Can We Protect Home Ownership and
Provide Relief to Consumers in Financial Distress?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2
(2007) [hereinafter Straightening Out] (statement of Mark Zandi, Chief Economist,
Moody’s Economy.com); CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UPDATED PROJECTIONS OF SUB-
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Harm to Cash-Strapped Borrowers

When borrowers started to default and the number of foreclosed houses
started to rise, the value of their homes either became stagnant or dropped.
Lenders would not extend these borrowers additional credit, even if they
were high-income borrowers. Because of this, homeowners could not tap
into their home equity or refinance their homes to reduce their monthly
payments to attempt to avoid a potential foreclosure.84
Of course, some borrowers were destined to default since they could
never afford the monthly loan payments. But, some borrowers appear to
have accepted exotic loans without understanding that other less expensive
lending options might be available, and some mortgage brokers steered
borrowers with good credit into higher-cost subprime mortgages.85 Borrowers without college degrees, lower income borrowers, and black and
Hispanic borrowers seemed especially likely to accept loan products they
did not understand and could not afford.86 Unsophisticated borrowers also
did not seem to be aware of the additional costs associated with homeownership, like setting aside money for routine maintenance,87 or did not realize that their loans did not escrow for taxes or property insurance.88
PRIME FORECLOSURES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR IMPACT ON HOME VALUES AND
COMMUNITIES (2008), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/updated-foreclosure-and-

spillover-brief-8-18.pdf; Levy, supra note 79.
84. Calculated Risk, supra note 34, at 12-13 (statement of Allen J. Fishbein, Director of
Housing and Credit Policy, Consumer Federation of America). Some reports suggest that
housing prices have not dropped this steeply since the Great Depression. See Bob Ivry &
Brian Louis, U.S. Home Construction Bust May Last Until 2011, BLOOMBERG, May 29,
2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aKQoeHb1MraI; Levy,
supra note 79. Not even the wealthiest communities in the country have avoided the wave
of foreclosures. Christine Haughney, Pain of Foreclosures Spreads to the Affluent, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2008, at C1.
85. See Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24 (statement of Shelia C. Bair,
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Insurance Corporation); id. at 6 (statement of Allen Fishbein, Director of Housing and Credit Policy, Consumer Federation of America); BUCKS & PENCE, supra note 25.
86. BUCKS & PENCE, supra note 25, at 22; Patricia A. McCoy, Elder Law: A Behavioral
Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON. L. REV. 725, 735 (2005) (explaining how predatory lenders prey on borrowers’ inexperience and lack of education).
87. John W. Schoen, Mortgage Woes Could Be ‘Tip of the Iceberg’, MSNBC, Apr. 10,
2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17929461/.
88. See The Role of the Secondary Market, supra note 23, at 17 (statement of Larry B.
Litton, Jr., President, CEO, Litton Loan Servicing LP) (recommending that subprime borrowers establish an escrow account to pay taxes and insurance); Susan Schmidt Bies, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the National Credit Union Administration 2007 Risk Mitigation Summit (Jan. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bies20070111a.htm (suggesting the prudence of escrowing tax and insurance payments or informing borrowers how much they
should set aside for those payments).
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Other Homeowners

Since mid-2007, homeowners who did not have risky mortgages and
who were not in default on those mortgages have bemoaned the fact that
their homes have plummeted in value because of foreclosed and vacant
homes in their neighborhoods. Studies consistently show that an increase
in foreclosures almost always will impose costs on neighboring properties
by decreasing the value of homes that are near the foreclosed property.89
Because appraisers determine the value of homes by considering comparable sales, foreclosed properties can reduce the value of all homes in the
neighboring area if they are used as comparables. Thus, owners of
neighboring properties who have acted responsibly and borrowed wisely
may still be harmed when they try to sell their properties or refinance
higher rate loans because of the stigma, economic effects, and the appearance of foreclosed properties near their homes.90
One of the main differences between this recession and the last recession
is the inability of homeowners to borrow against their homes to help them
pay their expenses during the recession.91 Once it became harder for potential home buyers to refinance loans or to borrow money to buy new
homes, the pool of available homebuyers shrank. With fewer buyers, the
demand dropped, which increased the supply of homes on the market,
which then caused the price of all homes to drop.92 For example, single-

89. Editorial, Losing Homes and Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2007, at A20;
Les Christie, The Ugly Face of Foreclosure, CNNMONEY, May 7, 2007, http://money.cnn.
com/2007/05/02/real_estate/face_of_foreclosure/index.htm.
90. Ian Urbina, Foreclosures Prompt Cities to Make Plea for Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2008, at A15; see also Calculated Risk, supra note 34, at 10 (statement of William A. Simpson, Vice President, Mortgage Insurance Companies of America); Stelzer, supra note 59
(discussing externalities caused by mortgage crisis and the presence of homes with uncut
grass); CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 83; Les Christie, Home Prices in Record
9% Decline, CNNMONEY, Nov. 18, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/18/real_estate/
home_prices_third_quarter/index.htm.
91. After borrowers started to default on their homes loans and were unable to borrow
money or obtain additional credit, they started to default on other loans. For example, the
automobile loan delinquency rate dramatically increased as a result of the mortgage meltdown, especially for borrowers who had subprime credit. David Cho & Nancy Trejos,
From Foreclosure Signs to Auto Repo Lots, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2008, at A1; Jeffrey
McCracken & Gregory Zuckerman, Surge in Auto-Loan Delinquencies Is Latest Trouble for
the Economy, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 6, 2007, at A1.
92. Tara Siegel Bernard, Tighter Mortgage Standards Could Prolong Housing Slump,
CNBC, May 15, 2007, http://www.cnbc.com/id/18663869/. Lenders appear to have become
especially wary of no doc and piggyback loans. See Bob Tedeschi, Ripples From the Subprime Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, at 11-13, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2007/03/25/realestate/25MORT.html?scp=1&sq=Ripples%20From%20the%20Subprime%
20Storm&st=cse.
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family housing prices have dropped approximately 8% since 2007 and are
at their lowest level since 1982.93
3.

Other Negative Externalities

As noted earlier, this financial crisis has had a catastrophic effect on the
entire financial community—especially the financial industry and other entities involved with mortgage securitization. Specifically, the liquidity restriction that led to the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, two
of the largest investment banks in the world, caused the U.S. government to
take over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and place them in a conservatorship, to purchase an 80% interest in American International Group (the
country’s largest insurance conglomerate) to agree to insure the holdings of
some money market mutual funds, to spend hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars to purchase debt from (and stocks of) U.S. banks, and has
forced the liquidation of a number of mortgage lenders and hedge funds
that invested in those lenders.94
In addition to the investment banks that collapsed (Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs) two other giant firms ceased to function as investment
banks and instead became bank holding companies.95 Smaller, regional
banks that expanded their operations in distant markets or offered new,
risky products also have suffered losses and have had lower than expected
earnings because of the liquidity crisis and increased defaults on consumer
loans.96 In addition, executives of large financial institutions, including
Citigroup, Merrill Lynch (which recently was sold because of its financial
problems), and Wachovia (the fourth largest bank in the United States
which was sold to Wells Fargo at the end of 200897), have been fired be-

93. Kenneth Musante, Foreclosure Filings Hit Record in April, CNNMONEY, May 14,
2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/05/14/real_estate/foreclosure_rates/index.htm?post
version=2008051408. Japan experienced a similar housing crisis in the 1990s, when prices
escalated drastically in the 1980s, then collapsed in the 1990s. Alex Tabarrok, Home Sweet
Investment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at A23; Christie, supra note 90.
94. Edmund L. Andrews, Vast Bailout by U.S. Proposed in Bid to Stem Financial Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at A1; Julia Werdigier, Official Assurances Fail to Stem Rush
of Withdrawals at British Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at C3.
95. Ron Chernow, The Lost Tycoons, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at WK12.
96. Geraldine Fabrikant, Tempest for a Bank That Bet on Risky Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
7, 2008, at C1; Robin Sidel, Smaller Banks Begin to Pay Price for Their Boomtime Expansion, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2008, at A1; David Ellis, Wachovia CEO out at Board’s Request, CNNMONEY, June 2, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/06/02/news/companies/
wachovia_thompson/index.htm.
97. Michael J. de la Merced, Regulators Approve Wells Fargo Takeover of Wachovia,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at B1.
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cause of decisions they made concerning mortgage products.98 Finally, our
domestic credit crisis extended to Europe, forcing governments there to
seize banks, bail out lenders, and guarantee all national bank deposits.99
4.

Other Non-Homeowner Borrowers

The mortgage crisis has had unintended consequences for people who
are not attempting to buy a house and who have not invested in or otherwise been involved with the buying or selling of mortgage products. Because of the credit restriction, college students are finding it harder to finance their educations because the economic crisis has made it harder for
families to pay for college.100 Students who attend community colleges,
for-profit technical schools, or colleges who have opted out of the federal
student loan program are finding it especially difficult to pay for college.101
Student loan lenders often raise money to make new loans by selling old
loans to companies that then bundled them into securitized financial instruments.
Similarly, because the mortgage crisis has now created an overall credit
crunch, many student loan lenders withdrew or retreated from the student
loan market when the number of investors willing to purchase the securitized financial instruments declined or severely tightened their lending
standards.102 Because of the student loan crisis, the U.S. government has
also been forced to intervene in the student loan industry to ensure that college students will be able to finance their educations.103
Finally, the credit squeeze has also made it difficult for colleges to raise
money by issuing bonds or by increasing tuition, or by raising money from
donors. As a result of the credit freeze, declining state support, and losses
on endowment earnings, colleges have been forced to halt construction pro-

98. Stelzer, supra note 59 (discussing the dismissal of Merrill Lynch’s Stanley O’Neal
and Citigroup’s Charles Prince); Jenny Anderson & Vikas Bajaj, Wary of Risk, Bankers
Sold Shaky Mortgage Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at A1; Ellis, supra note 96.
99. Joe Nocera, A Day (Gasp) Like Any Other, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008, at A1.
100. Jonathan D. Glater, Government Seeks to Buy Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2008, at A11.
101. An Alternative to Armageddon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at C2; Jonathan D.
Glater, Student Loans Start to Bypass 2-Year Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2008, at A1.
102. Robert Tomsho, Credit Crisis May Limit Options for Student Loans, WALL. ST. J.,
June 3, 2008, at D2. Included in this group are large lenders, such as Bank of America and
Citigroup. Robert Tomsho, Students Face Hit as Private Lending Dries Up, WALL. ST. J.,
Aug. 11, 2008, at A1.
103. Karla Schuster, Schumer to Feds: Help Students, NEWSDAY, Oct. 7, 2008, at A41.
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jects, impose hiring freezes, and, in some instances, have made it difficult
for colleges to pay their employees.104
5.

Urban Areas

For a number of reasons, the housing crisis has severely harmed urban
areas. Rising mortgage foreclosures have had a devastating effect on U.S.
cities because of the lower revenues they have received due to properties
which are now less valuable. Vallejo, a suburb of San Francisco, California, recently filed for bankruptcy protection because plunging home values
coupled with a sharp decline in property taxes and retail sales rendered it
unable to cover its expenses.105 Other cities have been forced to radically
reduce municipal services (like operating swimming pools or providing
free snow plowing services for older citizens) or to significantly increase
the municipal taxes and fees to compensate for lower than projected revenues.106
The seizing up of the credit markets has made investors leery of investing in the stock market or any security other than U.S. Treasury securities.107 This has made it increasingly difficult for localities to finance their
operations by issuing tax-exempt municipal bonds.108 Unlike the huge
capital infusion into the private financial markets, the Internal Revenue
Code generally prevents the federal government from guaranteeing taxexempt bonds.109

104. Kelly Field, Bank Freeze Leaves Hundreds of Colleges Cut off from Short-Term
Funds, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 10, 2008, at A20; Karin Fischer, Public Universities
Keep a Wary Eye on the Bond Market, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 9, 2008, at A1; Robin
Wilson, As Credit Crisis Freezes Colleges, Worries Mount, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 10,
2008, at A1.
105. Adam Tanner, San Francisco Suburb Vallejo Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS, May
23, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSN2352179020080523.
106. Nelson D. Schwartz, Can the Mortgage Crisis Swallow a Town?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
2, 2007, at C1.
107. David Goldman, Credit 2008: Year of the Freeze, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.
com/2008/12/31/markets/bondcenter/credit_market/index.htm. The credit market endured a
disastrous year in which the pipes of lending practically froze solid. But trillions of dollars
of bailouts is sending credit on the road to recovery. Id.
108. See 26 U.S.C. § 149(b) (2006); NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, OPTIONS FOR COORDINATING TAX-EXEMPT FINANCING WITH STIMULUS AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY LEGISLATION (2009), available at http://www.nabl.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=NABL_Comment_Letters_Position_Statements1&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTI
D=9109.
109. See NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, supra note 108.
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This financial crisis threatens to create the type of urban blight that cities
have struggled to eradicate and avoid over the last twenty years.110 Cities,
especially in urban areas, are now facing increased expenses because they
are often forced to repair vacant homes to eliminate problems (like roofs
and peeling paint) that are visible from the street. Studies suggest that
foreclosure rates increase a neighborhood’s rates for violent crime and, as a
result of the mortgage crisis, cities have been forced to increase police protection in neighborhoods populated by vacant homes.111 The mortgage crisis also is placing additional burdens on police departments because of the
increase in suspected arsons committed by homeowners who cannot afford
their mortgage payments and who are suspected of burning them rather
than losing them in foreclosure.112
Abandoned houses are natural targets for vandals and vagrants and, for
the last two years, neighbors and others have reported that criminals have
stripped foreclosed homes vacant of valuable items like copper and steel
and have used the homes for illegal activities, such as harvesting marijuana.113 Cities are also seeing shifts in the homeless population as renters
are joining the ranks of the homeless because they have been evicted from
homes they rented after the owners defaulted on their mortgages and the
homes were sold in foreclosure.114 Increased levels of homelessness have
put strains on shelters and also on public school systems, which are now
faced with the task of educating more transient children.115 Ironically, the
mortgage crisis has had one small benefit for people who were already
110. Ian Urbina, Foreclosures Prompt Cities to Make Plea for Aid, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2008, at A15 (discussing costs to board up properties, cut grass, demolish abandoned structures, collect trash, and protect from vandals). The costs imposed on cities also may include
the inability to borrow cheaply because of the decreased value of the collateral for those
loans (i.e., the assessed value of their property base). Monica Davey, Housing Downturn
Takes Big Toll on Cities’ Revenue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2007, at A20.
111. J.W. Elphinstone, Squalor, Crime Follow Wave of Foreclosures, MSNBC, Nov. 13,
2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21773482.
112. Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUSING STUD. 851 (2006), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005_conf_paper_session1_immergluck.pdf; Stelzer, supra note 59 (discussing how homes are stripped of sinks and aluminum siding during
the eviction process); Jon Birger, Will Foreclosures Spark an Arson Boom?, CNNMONEY,
Jan. 10, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/01/09/news/economy/birger_arson.fortune/index.
htm.
113. Preserving the American Dream, supra note 29, at 22-23 (statement of Douglas G.
Duncan, Senior Vice President of Research and Business Development, and Chief Economist, Mortgage Bankers Association), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_
files/duncan.pdf; Christie, supra note 89; Elphinstone, supra note 111.
114. Stephanie Armour, New Faces Join Ranks of Nation’s Homeless, U.S.A. TODAY,
June 26, 2008, at 1B.
115. Schwartz, supra note 106.
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homeless, as many homeless persons increasingly are squatting in vacant
homes. This, though, has placed yet more strains on police departments
who are forced to increase their patrols of certain neighborhoods.116
C.

Responses to Current Debt Levels

The initial response to the mortgage crisis was to ignore it and assume
that the mortgage market would correct any inefficiencies.117 Indeed, the
United States appeared to accept the mortgage industry’s contention that
additional mortgage regulations are harmful and unnecessary, would make
it harder for borrowers to get mortgage loans, would impede the basic
American “privilege” of homeownership,118 and would conflict with existing federal laws and policies that encourage and subsidize homeownership.119 Moreover, borrowers theoretically could protect themselves from
harmful credit products by shopping around in the marketplace, then choosing the product that best suits their needs.
For a short period of time, it did appear that the market had corrected
problems because many lenders (including the second-largest subprime
lender at that time, New Century Financial) stopped making bad loans as
soon as borrowers started to default and others went out of business altogether.120 But, market corrections simply were not enough to prevent the

116. Thomas J. Sheeran, Foreclosures Benefit One Group—Homeless, CHI. SUN TIMES,
Feb. 18, 2008, at 22.
117. Martin Crutsinger, Paulson Says Administration Is Opposed to Government Bailout
in Current Housing Crisis, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 17, 2007, at 1 (quoting Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, “I don’t think what we need is a big government bailout right now. I
think what we need is to help the markets work the way they’re intended to work and avoid
those foreclosures that are preventable.”).
118. See Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24, at 8 (statement of Harry H.
Dinham, President, National Association of Mortgage Brokers) (“No merchant, no government and no company should superimpose their own moral judgments on what is a basic
American privilege of homeownership.”).
119. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N, SUITABILITY—DON’T TURN BACK THE CLOCK ON FAIR
LENDING AND HOMEOWNERSHIP GAINS 20 (2007), available at http://www.mortgage
bankers.org/files/News/InternalResource/48134_Suitability-DontTurnBacktheClockonFair
LendingandHomeownershipGains.pdf; see Calculated Risk, supra note 34, at 13 (statement
of George Hanzimanolis, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers),
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/hanzimanolis.pdf (“Unwarranted tightening of underwriting guidelines could hurt the robust housing industry and deny deserving
consumers the chance at homeownership.”). While most entities involved with the mortgage industry oppose moratoriums of any kind, at least one loan servicing agency agreed
that a two-week “delay” would be appropriate. See The Role of the Secondary Market, supra note 23, at 17 (statement of Larry B. Litton, Jr., President, CEO, Litton Loan Servicing
LP).
120. New Century Financial stopped making subprime loans, filed for bankruptcy on
April 2, 2007, and is now in the process of selling off assets. See Ben Fidler, New Century
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subprime crisis from rippling through all financial sectors, or from sending
the U.S. economy into a recession and wreaking havoc in the global capital
markets. Starting with the Bear Stearns bailout, U.S. policy-makers were
forced to concede that a market response alone was woefully inadequate.
Market responses have failed, and will not prevent borrowers from making poor or totally irrational credit choices in the future in large part because of the information asymmetry that plagues the consumer credit market.121 The plethora and complexity of terms that govern credit card
transactions and non-traditional mortgage products make it almost inevitable that borrowers will be confused by the products, will be unable to comprehend the loan terms, and that it will be virtually impossible for borrowers to easily determine which loan product best meets their needs.122 While
credit card use is common, individual borrowers typically take out mortgages on an infrequent basis which means that borrowers will always be at
an informational disadvantage relative to lenders. Because of the complexity of credit card and mortgage products, “information overload” appears to
cause many borrowers to agree to terms and to accept products that have
terms they do not understand.123
Both state and federal regulators and legislators have attempted to find
ways to solve the over-indebtedness problem generally and the mortgage
crisis specifically. For example, federal regulators have considered standards used in some state consumer protection laws that require lenders to
consider whether mortgage loans, especially subprime loans, are suitable
for the borrower’s objectives and circumstances, and that such loans would
provide a demonstrable benefit to homeowners.124 In addition, some states

Assets Sale Continues, DEAL, Feb. 14, 2008; Morgenson, supra note 22; see also Eric Dash,
American Home Mortgage Says It Will Close, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at C1 (discussing
companies in the mortgage industry that were closing or facing bankruptcy).
121. See Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24, at 5 (statement of Shelia C.
Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); id. at 6 (statement of Allen
Fishbein, Director of Housing and Credit Policy, Consumer Federation of America); BUCKS
& PENCE, supra note 25, at 3; WIRANOWSKI, supra note 25, at 6 (discussing informational
rents extracted from naïve consumers by sophisticated lenders).
122. See Stephen Gandel et al., For Sale: Scenes from a Bubble, MONEY, May 2007, at
114; see also Preserving the American Dream, supra note 29, at 5 (statement of Hilary
Shelton, Director, NAACP Washington Bureau), available at http://banking.senate.gov/
public/_files/shelton.pdf.
123. REN S. ESSENE & WILLIAM APGAR, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD
UNIV., UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET BEHAVIOR: CREATING GOOD MORTGAGE OPTIONS FOR ALL AMERICANS 11 (2007).
124. See Possible Responses to Rising Mortgage Foreclosures: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Possible Responses]
(statement of John H. Dalton, President, Housing Policy Council of the Financial Services
Roundtable), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/htdalton041707.pdf.
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have enacted laws that require lenders to consider the borrower’s ability to
repay the loan, rather than the foreclosure value of the house, when approving a mortgage loan.125
Congress also has considered legislation that would revise the U.S.
bankruptcy laws to protect borrowers who owe more to the lender than the
home is worth because, for example, the borrowers paid interest only early
in the loan term, made no down payment and had not yet built up equity in
the home, or removed their equity with a home equity loan. The proposed
legislation would let borrowers reduce the amount of the lender’s interest in
the debtor’s principal residence to the market value of the home, and also
would let the consumer modify the terms of the loan, including extending
maturity dates and reamortizing the loan to potentially create a “balloon”
payment in anticipation of a loan refinance when interest rates (hopefully)
drop.126
The mortgage industry continues to fight bankruptcy reforms, even as
they aggressively lobby for bailouts for their industry. Lenders argue that
making it easier for borrowers to reduce the amount of their mortgage debt
will harm young, first-time homeowners as well as black and Hispanic borrowers by making loans that are already in default sink deeper into default,
and by forcing lenders to increase the costs of future loans to account for
the possibility that it may be harder for them to seize the collateral (the
home) through foreclosure.127 Lenders argue that the restrictions are not
needed because consumers can protect themselves by becoming more financially sophisticated and obtaining the information needed to make
sound borrowing decisions.128 Finally, lenders argue that preventing them

125. The Mortgage Lending Market: An Insiders’ Guide to Legislation and Litigation,
124 BANKING L.J. 867, 880-81 (2007); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-40-105 (2007) (an
unconscionable practice is “providing residential mortgage loans to consumers . . . without
regard to the consumer’s ability to repay a loan in accordance with its terms”); MINN. STAT.
§ 58.13 (2007) (no residential mortgage originator may “make, provide, or arrange for a
residential mortgage loan without verifying the borrower’s reasonable ability to pay the
scheduled payments”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.031 (West 2007) (an unconscionable
practice is “providing consumer transactions . . . without regard to the consumer’s ability to
repay the loan in accordance with its terms”).
126. S. 2136, 110th Cong. § 102 (2008); S. 2133, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007); H.R. 3778,
110th Cong. § 2 (2007); H.R. 3609, 110th Cong. (2007).
127. See Straightening Out, supra note 83 (statement of Steve Bartlett, President, CEO,
Financial Services Roundtable). But cf. id. (statement of Mark Zandi, Ph.D., Chief Economist, Moody’s Economy.com) (arguing that the legislation is needed and will not significantly increase the cost of mortgage credit).
128. Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24, at 8 (statement of Harry H. Dinham, President, National Association of Mortgage Brokers); Preserving the American
Dream, supra note 29, at 29-30 (statement of Douglas G. Duncan, Senior Vice President,
Research and Business Development, and Chief Economist, Mortgage Bankers Associa-
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from foreclosing on properties will also create negative externalities, such
as lowering the value of neighboring homes and giving criminals an incentive to vandalize vacant homes.129
While Congress has not been willing to revise bankruptcy laws to allow
debtors to reduce the amount of the debt they owe on homes that are now
worth less than their mortgages, Congress did create a program that allowed some borrowers to replace their non-traditional ARM loans with traditional thirty-year fixed-rate loans that have low LTV ratios. While the
program is voluntary, lenders who are willing to renegotiate the loan can
require borrowers to document their income, borrowers cannot take out a
home equity loan for five years after receiving this new mortgage, and borrowers must give the United States at least 50% of any appreciation on the
home when he sells it. Moreover, to prevent pure real estate flipping, if the
sale takes place in less than five years, the borrower might be required to
return all the gain to the government.130
In addition to rejecting the approach of not intervening at all in the market, or of embracing the government’s limited relief for borrowers (rather
than for lenders or those who invested in mortgage-backed securities), others have suggested or taken somewhat more radical approaches. Harvard
Law Professor Elizabeth Warren has recently argued that the United States
needs to have a “Financial Product Safety Commission” that reviews credit
cards, mortgage loans, and health and life insurance policies to make sure
the products have terms that consumers have a realistic chance of understanding. Professor Warren argues that this commission should be charged
with preparing and promoting uniform disclosures that make it easier for
consumers to compare different lenders’’ products. She also contends that
a commission of this type could be used to make sure that credit products
do not have terms that are impossible for the average consumer to assess.131

tion), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/duncan.pdf; Possible Responses,
supra note 124, at 11 (statement of George P. Miller, Executive Director, American Securitization Forum, also on behalf of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/htmiller041707.pdf.
129. Preserving the American Dream, supra note 29, at 22-23 (statement of Douglas G.
Duncan, Senior Vice President, Research and Business Development, and Chief Economist,
Mortgage Bankers Association); see also Christie, supra note 89.
130. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, H.R. 3221, 110th Cong. (2008);
Kenneth R. Harney, A Look at Congress’s Long-Promised, Long-Delayed Mortgage Relief,
WASH. POST, Jul. 19, 2008, at F1; News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev.,
Bush Administration Launches “Hope for Homeowners” Program to Help More Struggling
Families Keep Their Homes (Oct. 1, 2008), available at http://www.hud.gov/news/release.
cfm?content=pr08-150.cfm.
131. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(2008).
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The sheriff of the City of Philadelphia, with the implicit support of local
judges and political leaders, crafted a novel (though likely illegal) response
to the foreclosure crisis. As is true in many jurisdictions, the sheriff’s office in the City of Philadelphia has the legal duty to conduct foreclosure
sales. After Philadelphia citizens defaulted on their mortgages in record
numbers, the sheriff declared that his office would no longer conduct courtordered foreclosure auctions.132 Once mortgage lenders, servicers, and
their attorneys realized that the sheriff’s decision was becoming a public
relations problem for them—not the sheriff—they entered into an agreement with housing advocates and local judges to work out a process that
would make loans more affordable for delinquent borrowers.133 This response worked principally because the local judges were not willing to enter an order forcing the sheriff to conduct the foreclosures, and also because
housing advocates had successfully lobbied members of the city council,
who also supported the sheriff’s decision to halt foreclosure sales.134
III. POTENTIAL RESPONSES BY URBAN COMMUNITIES
While it may be unrealistic to expect cities to be the primary opponents
to the consumer credit industry, cities can no longer afford to take a handsoff approach to consumer credit or to expect the U.S. government to provide a billion-dollar bailout for cities or for the homeowners who live in
those cities. Therefore, urban areas will need to take a more proactive approach to protect themselves and their citizens during this financial crisis.
For a number of reasons, urban areas should be concerned with consumer over-indebtedness in general, as well as with the current mortgage
meltdown. Localities desire economically stable citizens and neighborhoods because they “market” their cities and citizens when attempting to
attract both new citizens and businesses. Having overwhelmed, overindebted citizens is not a particularly attractive selling point for cities that
wish to attract new businesses. Localities also have an interest in having
citizens who are not over-indebted because of the value this country generally places on individual entrepreneurship. To the extent the locality (or,
indeed, the nation) wants to encourage innovation, there must be some way
to help relieve the financial burdens that over-indebtedness poses on individuals, because individuals who are permanently in debt will never be able
to fully participate in a market society and will never be able to start a new

132. Michael M. Phillips, To Help Broke Homeowners, He’s Taking the Law into His
Own Hands, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2008, at A1.
133. Id.
134. Id.

DICKERSON_CHRISTENSEN

424

4/21/2009 3:51:06 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVI

business. Similarly, because this country and, as a result, localities depend
on consumer spending, localities, have an incentive to prevent overindebted consumers from drowning in credit; otherwise those consumers
will never be able to meaningfully contribute to the market economy.
Increased foreclosures also create the unexpected problem of the displaced voter. This unexpected challenge is particularly problematic for localities during a presidential election year. Because of the number of people who have been evicted from their homes this year, cities were forced to
address election issues like determining which residents were allowed to
vote in particular elections and where the residents should vote if they were
forced to move because of a foreclosure but failed to notify their local election boards.135 Fortunately, though, there is no indication that this affected
the 2008 national elections.136
To directly combat the problem of abandoned homes, urban areas will
need to consider how (or whether) to expand their role as landlords or land
developers. Because of the number of foreclosed properties in some urban
areas, cities have started to purchase, repair, and then resell foreclosed
properties rather than allow dilapidated properties to cause additional harm
to distressed neighborhoods.137 The subprime meltdown has forced other
cities to take even more drastic measures, including demolishing some vacant homes and turning the real property into parks or additional yards for
neighbors who remain in the neighborhood.138
Because of decreased property tax revenues, some localities cannot afford to purchase these properties and have sought financial assistance from
state legislatures, Congress, and in some instances, from the courts.139
While the Bush Administration originally opposed federal grants to help
localities purchase foreclosed properties, because of the recent massive
mortgage bailout,140 the Obama Administration has expressed its willingness to support governmental intervention in jump-starting local housing
135. See Ian Urbina, As Homes Are Lost, Fears that Votes Will Be, Too, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2008, at A18 (describing methods localities and states are using to verify voters’
addresses).
136. ASS’N OF CMTY. ORGS. FOR REFORM NOW, ADDING INSULT TO INJURY (2008), available at www.acorn.org/fileadmin/Reports/Insult_to_Injury_Report.pdf (discussing how
residency issues could potentially affect the then-upcoming 2008 presidential election).
137. See Vikas Bajaj, Communities Become Home Buyers to Fight Decay, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2008, at C1; Manny Fernandez, To Avert Blight, City Will Repair and Resell Vacant Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at A27.
138. See Bajaj, supra note 137.
139. See Conor Dougherty & Amy Merrick, States Squeeze Cities, Spreading the Economic Pain, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2008, at A4.
140. See Rosalind S. Helderman & Ovetta Wiggins, Localities Firming up Foreclosure
Aid Plans; Proposals Due Soon on Use of $22 Million, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2008, at B1.
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markets.141 Municipalities may also need to encourage Congress to consider revising the Internal Revenue Code or find other ways to allow the
federal government to guarantee municipal bonds without placing the municipalities’ tax-exempt status at risk.
Finally, since deregulating the consumer credit market caused the consumer credit explosion, another way to protect urban areas and innocent
homeowners is to intercede and re-regulate—at least partially—the mortgage market.142 Localities may need to lobby state legislators to make it
harder for payday lenders or title pawn companies to operate in their cities.
Further, while states currently allow their citizens to take out home equity
loans, localities should consider whether it is time to lobby their state legislators to enact laws that make it harder for cash-strapped borrowers to treat
their homes like an ATM card.
CONCLUSION
Record numbers of mortgage defaults have triggered a financial crisis
that has threatened the U.S. and global capital markets and will continue to
have a dramatic effect on U.S. cities. Given the magnitude of the mortgage
mess, most of the focus is on stemming the number of foreclosures and
preventing greater harm to the economy.
The bigger problem, of course, is the larger issue of consumer overindebtedness itself. While this country (and urban areas) certainly should
be concerned that people are losing their homes, to ensure that our current
problems do not repeat themselves in the future it is time for everyone to
focus not just on the mortgage debt that has caused borrowers to lose their
homes, but also to focus on ways to reduce the numbers of borrowers who
are just too deeply in debt.

141. Tami Luhby, Saving a City—One House at a Time, CNNMONEY, Jan. 29, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/29/news/economy/neighborhood_stabilization/.
142. On Strengthening our Economy: Foreclosure Prevention and Neighborhood Preservation: Hearing Before S. Banking Comm., 110th Cong. 4-5 (2008) (statement of Doris
W. Koo, President, CEO, Enterprise Community Partners, Inc.).

